Has China Lost Control of Ethnic Armies in Myanmar’s War-Torn Borderland?

外媒：中国已经失去了对缅甸边境少数民族军队的控制？

作者：贝蒂尔·林特纳         来源：伊洛瓦底江

（编者注：瑞典记者贝蒂尔·林特纳2023年文章，对中缅关系以及历史与现状非常了解，虽然其中有些偏颇，但该文还是具备一定的参考价值）

Alliance troops after seizing a regime camp on Monday in northern Shan State. / The Kokang

周一，联军部队占领了掸邦北部的一个军政权营地。/果敢

Is China finally turning its back on the ethnic armed groups across its border with Myanmar – and are they distancing themselves from their traditional benefactors in the Chinese security services? Coordinated attacks carried out by the Brotherhood Alliance – comprising the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army and Arakan Army – across northern Shan State which have led to the disruption of trade between China and Myanmar seem to indicate precisely that. And before what is termed “Operation1027” was launched by those three groups in late October, China issued arrest warrants for two leading members of the United Wa State Party and Army (UWSA), Chen Yanban, aka Bao Yanban, and Xiao Yanquan, aka He Chuntian. The Chinese have also reportedly detained Bao Junfeng, a deputy commander of the UWSA. He Chuntian is none other than the son-in-law of UWSP/UWSA supremo Bao Youxiang and Bao Junfeng is a nephew. Bao Yanban is a prominent businessman who operates casinos and scam compounds in the UWSA-controlled areas. All of them are accused of involvement in telecom fraud operations in areas near the Chinese border.

中国是否最终背弃了中缅边境的少数民族武装组织？这些武装组织是否与中国安全部门的传统恩人拉开了距离？由以果敢为基地的缅甸民族民主联盟军（MNDAA）、塔昂民族解放军和阿拉干军组成的三兄弟联盟在掸邦北部发动的协同袭击，导致中缅贸易中断，似乎恰恰表明了这一点。在这三个组织于10月下旬发起所谓的“1027行动”之前，中国对佤联军（UWSA）的两名主要成员陈彦班（又名包彦班）和肖彦全（又名贺春天）发出了逮捕令。据报道，中国还拘留了佤联军副指挥官包俊峰。何春天正是佤联军最高领导人包友祥的女婿，包俊峰是他的侄子。包彦班是一位著名的商人，在佤联军控制的地区经营赌场和诈骗场所。他们都被指控参与了中国边境附近地区的电信诈骗活动。

The UWSA is not a member of the Brotherhood Alliance and, after the attacks, declared its neutrality in the ongoing fighting. But the fact remains that the UWSA is the main supplier of weapons to the Alliance, and that those guns are of Chinese origin. Part of the seemingly confusing picture is also the Was’ close contacts with China’s security services which go back to the days when they formed the bulk of the fighting force of the now defunct Communist Party of Burma (CPB). Back in the 1960s and 1970s, the CPB received massive – and direct – support from China. That was never a secret. Chinese interactions with the UWSA may not be that overt and guns are provided mostly at “friendship prices”. But, even so, the UWSA is equipped with more and better Chinese military hardware than the CPB ever was.

佤联军不是三兄弟联盟的成员，袭击发生后，佤联军宣布在目前的战斗中保持中立。但事实仍然是，佤联军是联盟的主要武器供应商，而这些枪支来自中国。这一看似令人困惑的局面的部分原因还在于中共与中国安全部门的密切联系，这种联系可以追溯到中共组建了现已解散的缅甸共产党（CPB）的大部分战斗力量的时候。早在20世纪60年代和70年代，CPB就得到了中国的大量直接支持。这从来都不是秘密。中国与佤联军的互动可能不那么公开，枪支主要是以“友谊价格”提供的。但是，即便如此，UWSA装备了比CPB更多更好的中国军事装备。

The UWSA has not passed on the most sophisticated of its supplies from China, such as surface-to-air missiles, but the Brotherhood Alliance apparently had enough guns and ammunition to be able to carry out their series of attacks, which seem to have been astonishingly successful. China may not have played any part in Operation1027, but it is hard to believe that its well-connected security services were unaware of what was being planned and it appears that China did nothing to try to stop it. In short, the situation appears utterly confusing and completely devoid of logic.

佤联军还没有从中国获得最先进的物资，比如地对空导弹，但兄弟会联盟显然有足够的枪支和弹药来实施他们的一系列袭击，这些袭击似乎取得了惊人的成功。中国可能没有参与“1027行动”，但很难相信其关系良好的安全部门不知道这是什么计划，而且中国似乎没有采取任何措施来阻止它。简而言之，这种情况显得十分混乱，完全没有逻辑可言。

The locations of resistance attacks launched as part of Operation 1027 as of Nov. 2. / The Irrawaddy

截至11月2日，作为“1027行动”的一部分发起抵抗攻击的地点。/伊洛瓦底江

But the answer to speculation by outside observers about a major policy shift is no. Beijing has not changed the nature of its relationship with the ethnic armed organizations in the north, and these are not turning against China. Beijing’s long-term objectives remain the same: to exploit Myanmar’s natural resources and, most importantly, to secure the so-called China-Myanmar Economic Corridor which gives it strategic access to the Indian Ocean. To achieve those goals, China has always played all sides in Myanmar’s internal conflicts and it is therefore not, it should be remembered, in China’s interest to see the emergence of a strong, peaceful, democratic and federal Myanmar.

但对于外界观察人士猜测的重大政策转变，答案是否定的。北京并没有改变与北方少数民族武装组织关系的本质，这些组织也没有转而反对中国。北京的长期目标没有改变：开发缅甸的自然资源，最重要的是，确保所谓的中缅经济走廊（China-Myanmar Economic Corridor）的安全，这条走廊为中国提供了通往印度洋的战略通道。为了实现这些目标，中国一直在缅甸的内部冲突中扮演多方角色，因此，应该记住，看到一个强大、和平、民主和联邦制的缅甸出现不符合中国的利益。

As long as Myanmar is weak, China can play official games of being a “friendly neighbor” and “peacemaker” and, at the same time, use a carrot-and-stick approach to whatever government is in power: trade coupled with investment on the one hand and indirect support for the ethnic armed organizations on the other. If Myanmar ever became exactly that – strong, peaceful, democratic and federal – China would be the first to lose. The leverage China has today inside Myanmar would be gone. But then China does not want to see the situation get totally out of hand either, because that would mean serious instability in the frontier areas and, most likely, an unwanted flood of refugees across its border.

只要缅甸还弱小，中国就可以玩“友好邻邦”和“和平缔造者”的官方游戏，同时对任何掌权的政府都采取胡萝卜加大棒的策略：一方面是贸易和投资，另一方面是间接支持少数民族武装组织。如果缅甸真的变成那样——强大、和平、民主和联邦制——中国将是第一个失败的国家。中国今天在缅甸拥有的影响力将不复存在。但中国也不希望看到局势完全失控，因为那将意味着边境地区的严重不稳定，而且很可能出现不受欢迎的难民潮。

But China’s multifaceted – to use a euphemism – approach to Myanmar and its many internal conflicts has also created a number of problems which don’t stop at the common border. After the collapse of the CPB in 1989, which was caused by a mutiny among the predominantly Wa rank and file of its once powerful army, and the formation of the UWSA, a peace deal was agreed (but not signed) with the then junta in power in Myanmar, the State Law and Order Restoration Council. Part of the deal was that CPB mutineers, now UWSA and three other former communist forces turned ethnic armies, would be allowed to retain their armed forces and maintain control over their respective areas in exchange for not entering into any alliances with other ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar. They were also allowed to engage in any kind of business to sustain themselves – and that became a lucrative trade in narcotics, first opium and its derivative heroin and later methamphetamine.

但是，委婉地说，中国对缅甸的多面性态度及其内部冲突也造成了许多问题，这些问题不止于共同边界。1989年，缅共（CPB）因其曾经强大的军队中占主导地位的佤族士兵发生叛变而垮台，佤联军（UWSA）成立后，与当时掌权的缅甸军政府——国家法律与秩序恢复委员会（State Law and Order Restoration Council）——达成了一项和平协议（但未签署）。协议的一部分是，CPB叛变者，现在的UWSA和其他三支前共产主义部队，将被允许保留他们的武装部队，并保持对各自地区的控制，以换取不与缅甸其他民族武装组织结盟。他们还被允许从事任何商业活动来维持生计，这成为了一种利润丰厚的毒品贸易，先是鸦片及其衍生物海洛因，后来是甲基苯丙胺。

Within a couple of years of the mutiny, Myanmar’s illicit drug production had skyrocketed – and drugs began to spill over into China. The southern province of Yunnan, which borders Myanmar, was especially hard-hit. Heroin was everywhere, and local drug lords in China began establishing their own fiefdoms, including the gang that took over Pingyuan, a town in the south. By 1992, Pingyuan had become a “country within the country”, giving safe haven to outlaws and bandits from across China. It became a matter of internal security, and thousands of heavily armed troops, supported by armor, eventually moved in and recaptured Pingyuan. The drug lords were mostly ethnic Yunnanese Muslims known as Hui in China and Panthay in Myanmar, and they had extensive business contacts throughout the Golden Triangle, including former CPB areas.

在叛变后的几年里，缅甸的非法毒品产量暴涨，毒品开始流入中国。与缅甸接壤的南部省份云南受灾尤为严重。海洛因无处不在，中国的地方毒枭开始建立自己的封地，包括占领了南方小镇平原的黑帮。到1992年，平原已成为“国中之国”，为来自中国各地的不法分子和土匪提供了避风港。这成了内部安全问题，数千名全副武装的军队在装甲部队的支持下，最终进入并夺回了平原。毒枭大多是云南穆斯林，在中国被称为回族，在缅甸被称为潘泰族，他们在金三角地区有广泛的商业联系，包括前CPB地区。

United Wa State Army troops on parade during the 30th anniversary of the USWA in 2019. / The Irrawaddy

2019年佤联军成立30周年之际，佤联军部队参加阅兵仪式。/伊洛瓦底江

Another push against drug trafficking in Yunnan was launched in mid-1994. It followed the arrest of Yang Muxian, a younger brother of then Kokang chieftain Yang Muliang, a former CPB commander who after the 1989 mutiny had founded the MNDAA, which then had a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military. Yang Muxian was charged with smuggling hundreds of kilograms of heroin into Yunnan and was executed in Kunming in October 1994 along with 16 accomplices. No Was were charged or arrested at that time, but Bao Youxiang and other UWSA leaders were called several times to Kunming and told to make certain that drugs did not enter China. The situation was brought under control and China could carry on its relationship with the former CPB forces – the UWSA, the MNDAA, a unit based in Mong La in eastern Shan State, and a smaller group in Kachin State – in a frictionless manner.

1994年中期在云南发起了另一项打击贩毒的行动。此前，时任果敢首领杨牧良的弟弟杨牧贤被捕。杨牧良曾是缅甸共产党的指挥官，1989年兵变后，他成立了缅甸民族解放运动，并与缅甸军方达成了停火协议。杨木宪被控向云南走私数百公斤海洛因，1994年10月与16名共犯在昆明被处决。当时没有人被起诉或逮捕，但包友祥和佤联军的其他领导人被多次传唤到昆明，并被告知要确保毒品不进入中国。局势得到了控制，中国可以以无摩擦的方式继续与前CPB部队（UWSA， MNDAA，一个驻扎在掸邦东部孟的部队，以及克钦邦的一个较小的组织）保持关系。

This time the rough and tumble has been caused not by drugs but by telecom fraud that is being carried out in areas controlled by ethnic armed organizations across the border in Myanmar. IT specialists from not only Thailand and the Indian subcontinent but also far-away countries like Uganda and Ethiopia have been tricked or forced into running the operations. The main targets for the scams have been people and institutions in China, and Chinese officials believe that capital outflows as a result of the scams amount to at least US$40 billion. It was clear that the Chinese authorities had to take action. And they did.

这一次的混乱不是由毒品引起的，而是由缅甸边境的少数民族武装组织控制的地区进行的电信欺诈引起的。不仅有来自泰国和印度次大陆的IT专家，也有来自乌干达和埃塞俄比亚等遥远国家的IT专家被骗或被迫从事这些业务。这些骗局的主要目标是中国的个人和机构，中国官员认为，这些骗局导致的资本外流至少达到400亿美元。很明显，中国当局必须采取行动。他们做到了。

As was the case after the crackdown on drug trafficking in the 1990s, it will take some time for the Chinese to reestablish smooth relations with the ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar’s north. Despite the flow of drugs, China needed those groups in the 1990s for the same reason as it needs them today: to secure a geostrategic foothold inside Myanmar. The fighting may have brought bilateral, cross-border trade to a standstill, but that is unlikely to last for much longer. The current fighting in the north may even work to China’s advantage. The Chinese can now play another of the many cards they have up their sleeves: that of friendly, neighborly peacemakers. And China may, once again, be the winner.

就像上世纪90年代打击毒品走私后的情况一样，中国与缅甸北部的少数民族武装组织重建顺利关系需要一段时间。尽管毒品源源不断，但中国在上世纪90年代需要这些组织的原因与今天一样：在缅甸获得地缘战略上的立足点。战争可能使双边跨境贸易陷入停顿，但这种情况不太可能持续太久。目前在北方的战斗甚至可能对中国有利。中国人现在可以打出他们袖子里的另一张牌了：友好、睦邻的和平缔造者。中国可能再次成为赢家。

Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades.

贝蒂尔·林特纳是瑞典记者、作家和战略顾问，近40年来一直在撰写有关亚洲的文章。

作者：贝蒂尔·林特纳         来源：伊洛瓦底江