Social Media and Street Protests: Myanmar’s Pushback Against Chinese Influence

社交媒体和街头抗议：缅甸对中国影响的抵制

作者：Vaishali Basu Sharma         来源：伊洛瓦底江

People gather in front of the Chinese Embassy in Yangon on Feb. 11, 2021 to call on the Chinese government to reject the military coup in Myanmar. / The Irrawaddy

2月11日，民众聚集在中国驻仰光大使馆前，呼吁中国政府拒绝缅甸军事政变。/伊洛瓦底江

On April 2, Myanmar’s military opened fire on a Chinese Red Cross convoy of vehicles headed to Mandalay, one of the areas hardest hit by the recent 7.7 magnitude earthquake, to deliver relief supplies. Armed rebel group the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) alleged that the military used heavy machine guns to fire on the convoy as it passed through Nawnghkio Township in northern Shan State. But the military claim the convoy failed to inform them of its route and failed to stop when ordered, leading to the firing of warning shots.

4月2日，缅甸军方向前往曼德勒运送救援物资的中国红十字会车队开枪。曼德勒是最近7.7级地震受灾最严重的地区之一。武装反叛组织塔昂民族解放军（TNLA）声称，军方在车队通过掸邦北部的Nawnghkio镇时使用重机枪向其开火。但军方称，车队没有告知他们路线，也没有按照命令停车，导致军方鸣枪示警。

While some sources suggest this may have been an unintended incident, the exact cause remains unclear. What remains undeniable is that Chinese interests continue to face attacks within Myanmar. China’s active involvement in Myanmar’s internal conflict—including its support for both the military and armed resistance groups—further intensifies tensions.

虽然有消息称这可能是意外事故，但确切原因尚不清楚。不可否认的是，中国的利益在缅甸境内继续面临攻击。中国积极介入缅甸内部冲突，包括对军方和武装抵抗组织的支持，进一步加剧了紧张局势。

Just days before on March 21, 2025 a silent protest took place in Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State. Residents displaced by the conflict between the military junta and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) expressed their opposition to China’s involvement in brokering peace talks between the two parties. Protesters distributed posters urging China to respect Myanmar’s sovereignty and cease its support for the military regime.

就在几天前的2025年3月21日，北部掸邦首府腊戍发生了一场无声的抗议活动。因军政府与缅甸民族民主联盟军（MNDAA）冲突而流离失所的居民表示，他们反对中国参与斡旋双方之间的和平谈判。抗议者散发海报，敦促中国尊重缅甸主权，停止支持军政府。

Public frustration

公众的失望情绪

This protest is part of a broader trend of increasing anti-China sentiment in Myanmar. Over the past few years, public frustration has grown due to China’s perceived support for the military junta, its economic exploitation through controversial projects, and its interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs.

这次抗议活动是缅甸反华情绪日益高涨的大趋势的一部分。在过去的几年里，由于中国对军政府的支持，通过有争议的项目进行经济剥削，以及对缅甸内政的干涉，公众的不满情绪日益增加。

On Oct. 18, 2024, China’s consulate in Mandalay was targeted in an explosion. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian confirmed the attack on three days later, expressing Beijing’s “deep shock” and issuing a strong condemnation of the incident. Although China is an arms supplier to Myanmar’s junta, it maintains connections with ethnic groups opposing the military, creating a complex dynamic in the region. China’s ties in Myanmar form the background for the broader context surrounding the attack.

2024年10月18日，中国驻曼德勒领事馆遭到爆炸袭击。三天后，中国外交部发言人林坚证实了这起袭击事件，表示北京方面“深感震惊”，并对这一事件进行了强烈谴责。尽管中国是缅甸军政府的武器供应商，但它与反对军方的少数民族保持着联系，在该地区形成了复杂的动态。中国与缅甸的关系构成了围绕此次袭击的更大背景。

Independent analyst David Scott Mathieson feels that, “Whoever was behind the consulate bombing, it suggests that there are multiple strands of anti-Chinese anger, against the support for the regime and against the perceived support of China for the Kokang occupation of Lashio.” Speaking to VoA, Mathieson said that “China has to take this rising public anger very seriously, as it could potentially descend into violence in urban areas and against Chinese nationals and economic assets, but also Myanmar-Chinese communities as well.”

独立分析人士大卫·斯科特·马西森认为，“无论领事馆爆炸事件的幕后黑手是谁，这都表明有多种反华情绪，反对对缅甸政权的支持，也反对中国对果敢占领腊戌的支持。”马西森对美国之音说：“中国必须非常认真地对待这种不断上升的公众愤怒，因为它有可能在城市地区演变成针对中国公民和经济资产的暴力，也可能针对缅甸华人社区。”

Prior to that, in May 2023, protests erupted in Letpadaung, Sagaing Region, where demonstrators burned Chinese flags and pictures of then-Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang. Similar protests occurred in Yangon, Mandalay and other regions, with banners demanding that China respect the voice of the Myanmar people.

在此之前，2023年5月，实皆地区莱比当爆发了抗议活动，示威者焚烧了中国国旗和当时的中国外交部长秦刚的照片。在仰光、曼德勒和其他地区也发生了类似的抗议活动，他们举着横幅要求中国尊重缅甸人民的声音。

Demonstrations like the recent one in Lashio reflect the deep-seated grievances of the Myanmar people, who feel that China’s actions prioritize its strategic interests over the well-being of the local population.

最近在腊戍发生的示威活动反映了缅甸人民根深蒂固的不满，他们认为中国的行动将其战略利益置于当地人民的福祉之上。

Hate speech on social media

社交媒体上的仇恨言论

A study conducted by the research cell of Chinese social media platform Toutiao, in collaboration with analysis company Insecurity Insight, examined hate speech targeting China and Chinese people on Myanmar’s social media platforms from July 2024 to February 2025.

中国社交媒体平台今日头条的研究小组与分析公司不安全洞察合作进行了一项研究，调查了2024年7月至2025年2月期间缅甸社交媒体平台上针对中国和中国人的仇恨言论。

The findings reveal a deep-rooted anti-China sentiment, reflected in dehumanizing language, scapegoating, and calls for violence in Myanmar’s social media discourse. Netizens linked China to economic concerns, including dependence on Chinese products, trade imbalances and infrastructure dominance. Dehumanizing language, such as comments like “Chinese thinking is inherently inferior” and “Let them sink, those dogs,” exacerbates hostility. China is also blamed for social problems, with statements such as “Don’t import anything from them; their products are all fake and full of coronavirus.” Additionally, some remarks escalate this resentment further, with alarming calls for violence and expulsion, such as “expel Chinese nationals; commit genocide if necessary,” normalizing dangerous rhetoric. Another recurring theme is moral superiority, where claims like “China is terrible to be neighbors with—their morals are so low” frame Chinese individuals as inherently immoral, deepening social divides and perpetuating negative stereotypes.

调查结果揭示了一种根深蒂固的反华情绪，反映在缅甸社交媒体话语中的非人性化语言，替罪羊和呼吁暴力。网民将中国与经济问题联系在一起，包括对中国产品的依赖、贸易失衡和基础设施的主导地位。非人性化的语言，比如“中国人的思维本质上是低劣的”和“让他们沉下去吧，那些狗”，加剧了敌意。中国也因社会问题而受到指责，诸如“不要从他们那里进口任何东西；他们的产品都是假的，充满了冠状病毒。”此外，一些言论进一步加剧了这种怨恨，令人震惊地呼吁使用暴力和驱逐，例如“驱逐中国公民；必要时进行种族灭绝，”将危险的言论正常化。另一个反复出现的主题是道德优越感，像“与中国为邻是可怕的——他们的道德如此低下”这样的说法，将中国人视为天生不道德的，加深了社会分歧，并使负面的刻板印象永久化。

The study highlights that posts criticizing China’s border blockades—such as those at Muse and other northern Shan State checkpoints in October 2024—garnered significant attention. These blockades restricted goods like electronics and medical supplies, sparking public outrage and amplifying criticism of Chinese influence.

该研究强调，批评中国边境封锁的帖子——比如2024年10月在木寺和掸邦北部其他检查站的封锁——引起了极大的关注。这些封锁限制了电子产品和医疗用品等商品，引发了公众的愤怒，并放大了对中国影响力的批评。

According to a mid-2024 survey conducted by the Institute for Strategy and Policy Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar), 54 percent of key stakeholders in Myanmar expressed a negative perception of China as a neighbor. This sentiment was even stronger among civil society organizations, with 72 percent describing the PRC as either “not good at all” or “not a good neighbor.” Similarly, 60 percent of ethnic armed organizations and 54 percent of the People’s Defense Forces—comprising the armed wing of the National Unity Government and local defense forces formed after the coup—shared this unfavorable view.

根据缅甸战略与政策研究所（ISP-Myanmar）在2024年年中进行的一项调查，54%的缅甸主要利益相关者对中国作为邻国表示负面看法。这种情绪在民间社会组织中更为强烈，72%的人将中国描述为“一点都不好”或“不是一个好邻居”。同样，60%的少数民族武装组织和54%的人民国防军（由民族团结政府的武装派别和政变后组建的地方国防军组成）也持这种负面看法。

——编者注：（由民族团结政府的武装派别和政变后组建的地方国防军组成）“由民族团结政府的武装派别”，军政府政变后代言的民族团结政府结构缩写为UNG，武装缩写为PDF，属于西方在缅甸的代言人或者势力。“政变后组建的地方国防军组成”，代表的是敏昂来军政府领导下的民地武。比如妙瓦底的军头苏起督，克伦边防军领导人，控制妙瓦底地区的实力派人物，有“妙瓦底之王”之称。 以及果敢被打掉电诈四大家族，就是此类地方国防军。

In addition to protests against Beijing’s growing influence, hate speech targeting China and Chinese people in Myanmar’s social media environment has become a significant reflection of the country’s growing geopolitical tensions.

除了抗议北京日益增长的影响力外，缅甸社交媒体环境中针对中国和中国人的仇恨言论已成为该国日益加剧的地缘政治紧张局势的重要反映。

This online hostility not only mirrors the broader discontent but also amplifies it, creating a volatile digital space that influences real-world attitudes and actions. The hostile environment increases risks for Chinese businesses, aid agencies and diplomatic missions, as they become potential targets of public anger.

这种网络上的敌意不仅反映了更广泛的不满，而且还放大了这种不满，创造了一个不稳定的数字空间，影响着现实世界的态度和行动。这种敌对的环境增加了中国企业、援助机构和外交使团的风险，因为它们可能成为公众愤怒的目标。

Infrastructure projects at risk

面临风险的基础设施项目

The China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a flagship project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, aims to enhance economic connectivity between the two nations. However, the growing instability threatens its implementation, as infrastructure and trade routes face interruptions. Attacks on Chinese-backed projects and infrastructure have already been reported, reflecting the precarious position of Chinese entities in the region. One notable instance occurred in May 2023, when the Natogyi Guerrilla Force (NGF) attacked an off-take station for the China-funded oil and gas pipeline in the Mandalay region. The 973-km pipeline runs from the Rakhine coast, through Magwe and Mandalay regions and Shan state, to China’s Yunnan province. The attack occurred shortly after the Chinese foreign minister’s visit to Myanmar. Following the visit, anti-Chinese protests erupted across the country, with demonstrators reportedly burning Chinese flags in some areas, as noted by one of the observers mentioned earlier. In response to the pipeline attack, security measures have been significantly tightened.

中缅经济走廊（CMEC）是中国“一带一路”倡议的旗舰项目，旨在加强两国之间的经济联系。然而，由于基础设施和贸易路线面临中断，日益不稳定的局势威胁到其实施。针对中国支持的项目和基础设施的攻击已经有了报道，这反映出中国实体在该地区的不稳定地位。一个值得注意的例子发生在2023年5月，当时纳托吉游击队（NGF）袭击了曼德勒地区中国资助的石油和天然气管道的一个接收站。这条长达973公里的管道从若开邦海岸开始，经过马圭和曼德勒地区以及掸邦，最后到达中国云南省。这次袭击发生在中国外交部长访问缅甸后不久。访问之后，全国各地爆发了反华抗议活动，据报道，正如前面提到的一位观察员所指出的那样，示威者在一些地区焚烧了中国国旗。为了应对管道袭击，安全措施已经大大加强。

More recently, in November 2024, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) captured Kanpaiti, a vital trading town on Myanmar’s northeastern border with China and a significant hub for rare earth mining. This setback left only one border crossing town, Muse, and cut off access to valuable revenues from rare earth mines that supply China with essential materials for industries such as electric motors, wind turbines, advanced weaponry and electronics. The area is home to over 300 unregulated mines, which generated approximately US$1.4 billion worth of rare earths for China in 2024, often at severe environmental and social costs, according to a report by London-based environmental group Global Witness. In response to the KIA’s advances, China reportedly closed most border crossings, escalating tensions in the region.

最近，在2024年11月，克钦独立军（KIA）占领了缅甸东北部与中国接壤的重要贸易城镇Kanpaiti，这是一个重要的稀土开采中心。这一挫折只留下了一个过境城镇木姐（Muse），并切断了从稀土矿获得宝贵收入的途径。稀土矿为中国提供了电动机、风力涡轮机、先进武器和电子等行业所需的重要材料。据总部位于伦敦的环保组织“全球见证”（Global Witness）的一份报告称，该地区有300多座未经监管的矿山，这些矿山在2024年为中国生产了价值约14亿美元的稀土，往往付出了严重的环境和社会代价。据报道，作为对克钦独立军挺进的回应，中国关闭了大部分边境口岸，加剧了该地区的紧张局势。

In a reflection of the growing unpopularity of China among various groups, both within Myanmar and among its diaspora, last September, over 50 Burmese-Americans protested outside the Chinese Embassy in Washington, denouncing Beijing’s alleged interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs.

去年9月，50多名缅甸裔美国人在中国驻华盛顿大使馆外抗议，谴责北京据称干涉缅甸内政，这反映出中国在缅甸国内和海外各群体中越来越不受欢迎。

Since the coup, CMEC projects such as the deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu, the industrial park, and the high-speed rail link connecting Kunming in China to Mandalay have come to a halt.

自政变以来，CMEC项目，如皎漂深水港、工业园区，以及连接中国昆明和曼德勒的高速铁路，都已停止。

Rising hostility toward China in Myanmar is not just a reflection of geopolitical tensions but also a catalyst for further instability, with significant implications for regional dynamics and the safety of Chinese interests. The growing anti-China sentiment complicates Beijing’s efforts to maintain its strategic foothold in Myanmar, as it must navigate both local resistance and international scrutiny.

缅甸对中国日益增长的敌意不仅是地缘政治紧张局势的反映，也是进一步不稳定的催化剂，对地区动态和中国利益的安全具有重大影响。日益高涨的反华情绪使北京方面维持其在缅甸战略立足点的努力复杂化，因为它必须应对当地的抵制和国际监督。

 Vaishali Basu Sharma is a strategic and economic affairs analyst.

Vaishali Basu Sharma是一名战略和经济事务分析师。

作者：Vaishali Basu Sharma         来源：伊洛瓦底江