Beyond the Checkpoint: Myanmar Ethnic Alliance’s Rise as Border Governors

缅媒：超越检查站：缅甸少数民族联盟作为边境统治者的崛起

作者：Athena Awn Naw          来源：伊洛瓦底江 

The Kyin San Kyawt border trade gate in Myanmar’s northern Shan State in June 2025 / The Irrawaddy

2025年6月，缅甸北部掸邦的钦新皎边境贸易大门/伊洛瓦底江

Nearly two years after the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) seized control of key sections of the Myanmar-China border, their hold over the lucrative Muse 105-Mile Border Trade Zone and Kyin San Kyawt Border Gate has evolved from a wartime victory into a political and economic stronghold.

在三兄弟联盟（3BHA）控制了缅中边境的关键路段近两年后，他们对利润丰厚的Muse 105码边境贸易区和钦圣皎边境门的控制已经从战时的胜利演变为政治和经济的据点。

Far from being temporary spoils of war, these have become critical revenue sources for the alliance’s member groups, reshaping the balance of power in northern Shan State and providing a real-world test of their governance capacity. The alliance captured the Muse 105-Mile Border Trade Zone just two months after the first wave of the military offensive known as Operation 1027.

它们绝不是暂时的战利品，而是该联盟各成员集团的重要收入来源，重塑了掸邦北部的权力平衡，并为他们的治理能力提供了现实世界的考验。在第一次被称为“1027行动”的军事攻势的两个月后，该联盟占领了木姐105码边境贸易区。

The 3BHA—comprising the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army—has since entrenched itself as one of the most influential coalitions of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in the country. Operation 1027 showcased their unprecedented ability to coordinate large-scale offensives, seize strategic territory and sustain control in contested areas in northern Shan State.

3bha由缅甸民族民主联盟军（MNDAA）、塔昂民族解放军（taang National Liberation Army）和阿拉干军（Arakan Army）组成，自此确立了自己作为缅甸最具影响力的民族武装组织联盟（eao）之一的地位。1027行动展示了他们在协调大规模进攻、夺取战略领土和维持对掸邦北部有争议地区的控制方面前所未有的能力。

Two of the three main export-import gates at Muse Station have come under the control of the 3BHA. Before their takeover, the three gates together handled trade worth an estimated US$5 billion annually, translating to roughly $13.7 million in trade value per day. Among them, Kyin San Kyawt handled the largest share and the majority of trade between the two countries.

木姐站的三个主要进出口门中有两个已由3BHA控制。在被接管之前，这三个大门每年处理的贸易额估计为50亿美元，换算成每天的贸易额约为1370万美元。其中，缅新贸易占两国贸易的最大份额和绝大部分。

Cargo trucks enter China from the Kyin San Kyawt border gate in Myanmar’s northern Shan State in June 2025. / The Irrawaddy

2025年6月，货运卡车从缅甸北部掸邦的钦新皎边境口岸进入中国。/伊洛瓦底江

From seizure to structured revenue

▲从扣押到结构性收入

Following months of disruption, Chinese provincial authorities quietly allowed goods from the Chinese side to resume legal entry into Myanmar through a 3BHA-held checkpoint in March this year. This pragmatic move aimed to restore cross-border trade and prevent economic stagnation in the border region, rather than signal political endorsement. However, China continues to block the export of goods that could reinforce the military activities of EAOs.

经过几个月的中断，今年3月，中国省级当局悄悄允许来自中国的货物通过3bha设立的检查站恢复合法进入缅甸。这一务实的举措旨在恢复跨境贸易，防止边境地区的经济停滞，而不是发出政治支持的信号。然而，中国继续阻止可能加强eao军事活动的货物出口。

Capitalizing on this, the 3BHA began systematically collecting taxes at the gates, implementing a system modeled after Chinese procedures—including online registration and vehicle licensing.

利用这一点，3BHA开始系统地在门口征税，实施了一个模仿中国程序的系统，包括在线登记和车辆许可。

The new tax software was initially available only in Chinese but was upgraded within a week to include Burmese and English interfaces to assist local traders and logistics companies. To ensure smooth operations and rapid problem-solving, the 3BHA launched an official WeChat account dedicated to managing tax applications, registrations, permits and border entry and exit. A dedicated staff member promptly answers queries from logistics companies and traders, improving transparency and communication.

这款新的税务软件最初只提供中文版本，但在一周内进行了升级，包括缅甸语和英语界面，以帮助当地贸易商和物流公司。为了确保顺利运作和快速解决问题，3BHA推出了一个官方微信账户，专门管理税务申请、登记、许可和边境出入境。专门的工作人员及时回答物流公司和贸易商的疑问，提高透明度和沟通。

Normally, over 600 vehicles cross daily from China’s Yunnan Province into Myanmar, according to a Chinese logistics company. The border trade sustains nearly 400 logistics companies involved in China-Myanmar commerce, underscoring the checkpoints’ economic importance.

据一家中国物流公司称，正常情况下，每天有600多辆汽车从中国云南省进入缅甸。边境贸易支撑着近400家参与中缅贸易的物流公司，凸显了边境检查站在经济上的重要性。

A member of the 3BHA processes paperwork for cargo trucks at the Kyin San Kyawt border trade gate in June 2025. / The Irrawaddy

2025年6月，3BHA的一名成员在钦新觉边境贸易门处理货运卡车的文书工作。/伊洛瓦底江

To further streamline trade, the 3BHA opened an online system, inviting China-Myanmar shippers and logistics firms to join. There are no special prerequisites beyond commitment to freight transport. Applicants must submit key documents within a week—including business licenses and ID copies—for verification. Approved companies gain access to the station’s customs tax account, enabling rapid and compliant online tax declarations and vehicle registrations.

为了进一步简化贸易，3BHA开通了一个在线系统，邀请中缅航运公司和物流公司加入。除了承诺货物运输外，没有特别的先决条件。申请人必须在一周内提交关键文件，包括营业执照和身份证复印件，以便核实。获得批准的公司可以进入该站的海关税务账户，实现快速和合规的在线税务申报和车辆登记。

“In the first month, it was quite difficult,” a local truck driver told The Irrawaddy. “But now trucks pass through smoothly. Their tax collection system is very fast.”

当地一名卡车司机对《伊洛瓦底报》说：“第一个月，情况相当困难。”“但现在卡车顺利通过。他们的税收征收系统非常快。”

The Irrawaddy sought details from the MNDAA on the alliance’s daily collection rates but did not receive a reply.

《伊洛瓦底江报》向MNDAA询问了该联盟每日收款率的细节，但没有收到回复。

After the border gate reopened under 3BHA control with the new tax system, China’s state broadcaster CCTV sent reporters to cover border trade activity on the Chinese side in Wangding, showcasing the efficient border management by the ethnic armed groups.

在新税制下，边境大门在3BHA的控制下重新开放，中国国家电视台中央电视台（CCTV）派记者前往王定报道中国一侧的边境贸易活动，展示了少数民族武装组织对边境的有效管理。

An aerial view of the Muse 105-Mile Border Trade Zone

木姐105码边境贸易区的鸟瞰图

An economic lifeline EAOs won’t give up

▲这是eao不会放弃的经济命脉

Before the coup, the Muse 105-Mile border trade station handled an annual trade volume worth around $5.5 billion, making it the largest border trade station between two countries. Post-coup instability has slashed that figure to roughly $2.2 billion per year. For the military regime, losing direct control over these gates is more than an economic setback; it is a strategic humiliation. These checkpoints were once pillars of state revenue, and their loss signals both financial and symbolic weakening of military authority.

在政变之前，木姐105码的边境贸易站每年的贸易额约为55亿美元，是两国之间最大的边境贸易站。政变后的不稳定将这一数字大幅削减至每年约22亿美元。对于军事政权来说，失去对这些大门的直接控制不仅仅是经济上的挫折；这是一种战略性的羞辱。这些检查站曾经是国家收入的支柱，它们的损失既标志着财政上的削弱，也象征着军事权威的削弱。

“The military has lost more than just territory here,” said a local businessman familiar with border trade. “They’ve lost access to the money that funds their operations.”

“军方在这里失去的不仅仅是领土，”一名熟悉边境贸易的当地商人表示。“他们失去了获得运营资金的渠道。”

The regime has repeatedly pressed Beijing to pressure EAOs to return the gates, but such appeals have fallen flat. From the 3BHA’s perspective, the gates are not bargaining chips—they are steady revenue generators and leverage points in future political negotiations. The tax income supports military operations and emerging governance structures in newly controlled areas. Relinquishing them would mean surrendering financial autonomy and strategic advantage.

军政府曾多次向北京施压，要求其向eao施压，让它们归还大门，但这些呼吁都没有奏效。从3BHA的角度来看，这些大门不是讨价还价的筹码——它们是稳定的收入来源，也是未来政治谈判的杠杆点。税收收入支持新控制区的军事行动和新兴治理结构。放弃它们将意味着放弃财务自主权和战略优势。

A major milestone was the official opening of the first large public hospital in Mong Yu, near the 105-Mile Trade Zone, on July 8. After more than two years of preparation, and managed by staff employed by the 3BHA, the hospital now offers 24-hour medical services—including blood tests, X-rays, ultrasounds and general care—serving locals, traders and workers who previously had to travel long distances for urgent treatment.

7月8日，第一家大型公立医院在105码贸易区附近的b孟Yu正式开业，这是一个重要的里程碑。经过两年多的筹备，在3BHA雇佣的工作人员的管理下，这家医院现在提供24小时医疗服务，包括血液检查、x光检查、超声波检查和一般护理，为以前不得不长途跋涉接受紧急治疗的当地人、商人和工人提供服务。

The management of the border gates, along with public services like the hospital, has become a showcase of the alliance’s governance ambitions. Efficient revenue collection and transparent procedures are central to its effort to present itself as a capable governing authority. This serves to bolster local legitimacy and signal to external actors, especially China, that the alliance can ensure stability where the junta cannot.

边境大门的管理，以及医院等公共服务，已经成为该联盟治理雄心的展示。有效的税收和透明的程序是其努力使自己成为一个有能力的管理当局的核心。这有助于加强当地的合法性，并向外部行动者（尤其是中国）发出信号，即联盟可以确保军政府无法确保的稳定。

Location of the 105-Mile Muse Trade Zone and Kyin San Kyawt Trade Gate

105码木姐贸易区和钦新觉贸易门的位置

Fragmented control and the trader’s burden

▲分散的控制和贸易商的负担

On the other hand, the military continues to control Muse town, which has two border gates primarily allowing the entry and exit of people with hand-carried goods. These gates remain tightly controlled, limiting the flow of goods passing through. The Muse 105-Mile Border Trade Zone is located approximately 5 km from the town of Muse, Myanmar

另一方面，军方继续控制Muse镇，该镇有两个边境大门，主要允许携带手提物品的人进出。这些大门仍然受到严格控制，限制了通过的货物流量。Muse 105码边境贸易区位于缅甸Muse镇约5公里处

In contrast, goods are flowing freely through the Kyin San Kyawt gate, which is controlled by the 3BHA, according to a local resident of Muse Township.

相比之下，据木斯镇的一名当地居民说，货物可以自由地通过由3BHA控制的钦圣觉门。

Due to the reopening of the border gates, goods are flowing back in, allowing trade to resume. As a result, Chinese products are also reappearing in Muse and in Lashio.

由于重新开放边境大门，货物正在回流，贸易得以恢复。因此，中国产品也重新出现在木姐和腊戍。

Aside from paying taxes, goods have been transported without major obstacles, and Chinese products have become widely available again since late April, a Lashio resident said.

一位腊戍居民说，除了纳税，货物运输也没有太大障碍，自4月底以来，中国产品又开始广泛销售。

Transborder cargo trucks at the Kyin San Kyawt border trade gate in Myanmar’s northern Shan State in June 2025 / The Irrawaddy

2025年6月，缅甸北部掸邦的Kyin San Kyawt边境贸易门口的跨境货运卡车/伊洛瓦底

While the 3BHA’s gate management appears organized, transporting goods between the border and Myanmar’s central markets remains costly and dangerous.

虽然3BHA的大门管理看起来很有组织，但在边境和缅甸中央市场之间运输货物仍然昂贵且危险。

3BHA-controlled areas extend only as far south as Hsipaw; beyond that, the junta maintains control. The military has intensified vehicle inspections and even seized trucks en masse in Mandalay, disrupting trade.

3bha控制的地区仅向南延伸至西爪；除此之外，军政府仍保持控制。军方加强了对车辆的检查，甚至在曼德勒扣押了大量卡车，扰乱了贸易。

Traders face a double or triple taxation system: official Myanmar military customs duties in Lashio, plus informal “security” or extortion fees at multiple checkpoints controlled by the Myanmar military and armed groups. These fees range from 200,000 to 700,000 kyats (about $95 to $330) per trip, forcing drivers to carry large amounts of cash.

贸易商面临双重或三重征税制度：在腊戍，官方的缅甸军事关税，以及在缅甸军方和武装组织控制的多个检查站，非正式的“安全”或勒索费。这些费用从每次20万至70万缅元不等（约合95美元至330美元），迫使司机携带大量现金。

“It’s not just the border—the road is full of checkpoints where you have to pay again and again,” said a highway driver. “Sometimes, we have to prepare extra money just to avoid trouble.”

一位高速公路司机说：“不仅仅是边境，路上到处都是检查站，你必须一次又一次地付钱。”“有时候，为了避免麻烦，我们不得不准备额外的钱。”

This fragmented control and predatory taxation erode much of the efficiency gained at 3BHA-run gates, illustrating how Myanmar’s fractured territorial map imposes structural costs on commerce.

这种分散的控制和掠夺性的税收侵蚀了3bha管理的大门所获得的大部分效率，说明了缅甸支离破碎的领土地图如何给商业带来结构性成本。

On the Chinese side, there is an agreement to keep border gates only at Kyin San Kyawt, and to not open additional gates along the route. However, a local resident said that this arrangement has yet to fully ease the difficulties faced by traders.

在中国方面，双方达成了一项协议，即只在钦San Kyawt保留边境大门，并且不会在沿线开放额外的大门。然而，一位当地居民表示，这一安排尚未完全缓解商人面临的困难。

Although goods have returned in large quantities, prices have soared to sky-high levels. As a result, illegal activities, drug trafficking and gambling houses have become more rampant in the area, a Lashio local said.

尽管货物大量返回，但价格已飙升至天价。因此，非法活动、贩毒和赌场在该地区变得更加猖獗，一位腊戍当地人说。

China’s calculated pragmatism

▲中国深思熟虑的实用主义

Beijing’s role is one of careful balance. China has clear economic and security interests in a smoothly functioning border but recognizes the junta’s weakened grip on northern Shan.

北京方面的角色是保持谨慎的平衡。一个平稳运转的边界显然对中国有经济和安全利益，但中国承认缅甸军政府对掸邦北部的控制有所削弱。

China engages pragmatically with actors who deliver stability—currently, that means the 3BHA. This arrangement keeps trade flowing, minimizes disruptions, and allows China to retain influence on both sides without committing to one party outright.

中国务实地与带来稳定的参与者进行接触——目前，这意味着3BHA。这种安排保持了贸易往来，最大限度地减少了干扰，并允许中国在不直接向一方承诺的情况下保持对双方的影响力。

Border as political laboratory

▲边境是政治实验室

Control over the Muse 105-Mile Border Trade Zone and Kyin San Kyawt Border Gate offers more than financial gain—it is a political laboratory for the 3BHA’s governance model. Few armed groups in wartime Myanmar have the resources or opportunity to prove administrative competence over such a high-value, internationally connected zone.

对木姐105码边境贸易区和钦新觉边境门的控制提供的不仅仅是经济利益——它是3BHA治理模式的政治实验室。在战争时期的缅甸，很少有武装组织有资源或机会来证明对这样一个高价值、与国际联系紧密的地区的管理能力。

Effective management of the gates strengthens the 3BHA’s negotiating power and provides China with stability along a key trade corridor. Long-term success depends on balancing revenue collection with economic development, as traders tolerate predictable taxes and services but remain vulnerable to extortion.

对门户的有效管理增强了3BHA的谈判能力，并为中国提供了关键贸易走廊沿线的稳定。长期的成功取决于在税收和经济发展之间取得平衡，因为贸易商容忍可预测的税收和服务，但仍然容易受到敲诈勒索。

Control of these gates marks a structural shift in northern Shan’s political economy, boosting EAO revenues, reducing reliance on external backers and showcasing governance capacity through services like hospitals. The junta’s inability to reclaim these arteries highlights its waning leverage, while China’s pragmatic acceptance reflects that power lies with those who can hold and govern territory.

控制这些大门标志着掸邦北部政治经济的结构性转变，增加了EAO的收入，减少了对外部支持者的依赖，并通过医院等服务展示了治理能力。军政府无力收回这些要道，突显了其影响力的减弱，而中国的务实接受则反映出，权力掌握在那些能够控制和治理领土的人手中。

For the 3BHA, the gates symbolize enduring control and an evolving governance model.

对于3BHA，闸门象征着持久的控制和不断发展的治理模型。

Athena Awn Naw specializes in analyzing ethnic conflict dynamics in Myanmar, focusing on China’s expanding influence across economic sectors. Her expertise includes the socioeconomic impacts of China’s involvement, its role in Myanmar’s armed conflicts and peace processes, and its participation in regional initiatives.

Athena Awn Naw专门分析缅甸的种族冲突动态，关注中国在经济领域不断扩大的影响力。她的专长包括中国参与的社会经济影响，中国在缅甸武装冲突与和平进程中的作用，以及中国在地区倡议中的参与。

作者：Athena Awn Naw         来源：伊洛瓦底江