The Hidden Fallout From China’s Cross-Border Crime Crackdown in Myanmar

缅媒：中国在缅甸打击跨境犯罪的潜在影响

作者：Athena Awn Naw         来源：伊洛瓦底江

Chinese security personnel escort Chinese nationals from the Wa region near the China-Myanmar border, following a coordinated operation on September 6, 2023. / WSTV

9月6日，中国安全人员在中缅边境附近的佤族地区护送中国公民。/ WSTV

In recent months, China’s fierce crackdown has upended northern Myanmar’s border towns—once hotspots for sprawling online scam syndicates. Tens of thousands have been forcibly sent back to China, many tied to massive fraud rings targeting Chinese and foreign victims.

近几个月来，中国的严厉打击行动颠覆了缅甸北部的边境城镇，那里曾经是网络诈骗团伙的聚集地。数以万计的人被强行遣返中国，其中许多人与针对中国和外国受害者的大规模诈骗团伙有关。

What once seemed like fiction became reality: mass prisoner or victim exchanges at border crossings, Kokang leaders handed over to Beijing as mafia scapegoats, and dramatic raids by ethnic armed groups on scam dens. These raids laid bare the extent of the industry—abandoned offices filled with luxury goods, high-tech equipment, and evidence of billions of dollars flowing through a criminal network that once thrived under militia protection.

曾经看起来像是虚构的东西变成了现实：在边境口岸大规模交换囚犯或受害者，果敢领导人作为黑手党的替罪羊被移交给北京，少数民族武装组织对诈骗窝点进行了戏剧性的袭击。这些突袭暴露了这个行业的范围——废弃的办公室里堆满了奢侈品、高科技设备，还有数十亿美元通过一个犯罪网络流动的证据，这个犯罪网络曾经在民兵的保护下蓬勃发展。

Over the past two years, Myanmar has transferred more than 53,000 individuals to China in connection with online scam operations along the China-Myanmar border, according to statements from China’s Ministry of Public Security and Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC), as the ruling military junta is known.

根据中国公安部和缅甸国家行政管理委员会的声明，在过去的两年里，缅甸已经向中国转移了53000多名与中缅边境网络诈骗活动有关的人。

However, following intense pressure from Beijing and a wave of armed conflict, those scam centers are no longer active—at least not there.

然而，在来自北京的巨大压力和一波武装冲突之后，这些诈骗中心不再活跃——至少不在那里。

Now, they’ve simply gone deeper.

现在，他们只是走得更深了。

■Forced inward 被迫向内

The scam operations have not disappeared—they’ve relocated. Pushed out of northern border towns, many syndicates have now moved into eastern and southern Shan State. Their continued operations are reportedly taking place under the protection of local armed groups, spreading across at least 14 townships in the region.

诈骗活动并没有消失——他们已经转移了。许多犯罪集团被赶出了北部边境城镇，现在已经转移到掸邦东部和南部。据报他们在当地武装团体的保护下继续行动，在该地区至少14个乡镇蔓延。

According to local civil society organizations, many scam centers that once operated in the Wa and Kokang self-administered zones have now relocated to other parts of Shan State. These operations have increasingly taken root in southern Shan townships such as Kunhing, Mongpan, Mong Hsu, Mongyai, Laihka, Tangyan, Namhsan, Mongnawng and Mongping. China’s crackdown on online scam syndicates in late 2023 initially disrupted operations in border towns like Laukkai and Myawaddy. Raids led to thousands of arrests and repatriations. However, by mid-2024, that momentum faded as the scam centers moved inward, away from border areas.

据当地民间社会组织称，许多曾经在佤邦和果敢自治区经营的诈骗中心现在已经转移到掸邦的其他地区。这些活动越来越多地在昆兴、蒙攀、bbbhsu、蒙崖、莱卡、唐岩、南山、蒙旺和蒙平等南部山区乡镇扎根。中国在2023年底对网络诈骗集团的打击，最初扰乱了寮开和妙瓦底等边境城镇的业务。突袭行动导致数千人被捕和遣返。然而，到2024年中期，随着诈骗中心向内转移，远离边境地区，这种势头减弱了。

Authorities from the Wa region and Chinese security personnel sign an agreement for the transfer of Chinese nationals from scam centers in the Wa Self-Administered Region on September 6, 2023. / WSTV

2023年9月6日，佤族当局和中国安全人员签署了一项协议，将中国公民从佤族自治区的诈骗中心转移。/ WSTV

“What was once mainly China’s problem has now become a bigger issue for us. It feels like we’re the ones bearing the brunt now, with no one stepping up to take responsibility or offer solutions,” Nang Hon, a member of Shan civil society, told The Irrawaddy. Nang Hon is part of a local watchdog group monitoring Chinese investments and activities, primarily in northern Shan State but which also has people working in southern Shan providing it with data. The group, which was organized by Shan politicians, works to hold external actors accountable and raise awareness of the impacts on local communities.

“曾经主要是中国的问题，现在对我们来说已经成为一个更大的问题。感觉我们现在是首当其冲的人，没有人站出来承担责任或提供解决方案，”掸邦公民社会成员Nang Hon告诉伊洛瓦底。Nang Hon是当地一个监督中国投资和活动的组织的成员，该组织主要在掸邦北部监测中国投资和活动，但也有人在掸邦南部工作，为其提供数据。该组织由掸族政治家组织，致力于追究外部行为者的责任，并提高对当地社区影响的认识。

She added that these scam centers have spread across villages in at least nine townships in southern Shan State—for example Wanhai, Wang Pan and Wanlay villages in Laihka Township—effectively rebuilding their operations under the protection of Shan armed groups. “The villages are now swarming with young people who clearly aren’t from around here. They look like they’ve come from cities like Yangon—their clothing and behavior are very different from the locals,” she said.

她补充说，这些诈骗中心已经遍布掸邦南部至少9个乡镇的村庄，例如莱卡镇的万海村、王蟠村和万莱村，在掸邦武装组织的保护下有效地重建了他们的业务。“村子里现在挤满了显然不是本地人的年轻人。他们看起来像是从仰光这样的城市来的——他们的衣着和行为与当地人非常不同，”她说。

According to a local resident from Naung Harn Village in Mongpan Township, the scam industry has become a source of livelihood for many villagers. “When the Chinese authorities launched crackdowns, people involved in scams fled here. Locals started renting them homes and selling them food—it’s become a way to earn a living. Their operations have been running for quite some time now, though we don’t really know exactly what they’re doing,” the resident told The Irrawaddy.

据蒙潘镇Naung Harn村的一名当地居民说，诈骗行业已经成为许多村民的生计来源。“当中国当局发起打击时，参与诈骗的人逃到了这里。当地人开始租给他们房子，卖给他们食物——这已经成为一种谋生的方式。他们的行动已经进行了一段时间了，尽管我们真的不知道他们到底在做什么，”这位居民告诉伊洛瓦底。

She described how waves of young people—many appearing to come from upper Myanmar and urban areas like Yangon—have flooded into the villages, allegedly seeking job opportunities. “There are also many Chinese among them. At the village entrance, armed checkpoints are easily passed—it’s as if everything is quietly being allowed,” she added.

她描述了一波又一波的年轻人——许多人似乎来自缅甸北部和仰光等城市地区——涌入村庄，据称是为了寻找工作机会。“其中也有很多中国人。在村庄入口处，武装检查站很容易通过——就好像一切都被悄悄允许一样，”她补充道。

Online scams along the China-Myanmar border take several forms. One major type is romance-based investment fraud, where victims are tricked into fake relationships and convinced to invest in bogus platforms, often involving cryptocurrency. Illegal online gambling is also common, with unregulated platforms luring users before disappearing with their money. Many people fall victim to job scams, arriving in border areas expecting high-paying work, only to be forced into scam operations under abusive conditions. Additionally, cybercriminals carry out phishing and corporate email scams, impersonating companies to steal funds or sensitive information.

中缅边境的网络诈骗有几种形式。一种主要类型是基于浪漫的投资欺诈，受害者被骗进入虚假的关系，并被说服投资虚假的平台，通常涉及加密货币。非法在线赌博也很常见，不受监管的平台引诱用户，然后带着他们的钱消失。许多人成为工作诈骗的受害者，来到边境地区期望高薪工作，却被迫在恶劣的条件下进行诈骗活动。此外，网络犯罪分子实施网络钓鱼和企业电子邮件诈骗，冒充公司窃取资金或敏感信息。

In addition, eastern Shan areas—particularly Tachileik, Mong Hsat, and Mongton—have also seen the emergence or expansion of scam-related activity. Likewise, northern Shan townships such as Namkham, Namhsan and Muse have become key hotspots, where criminal networks exploit weak law enforcement and ongoing regional instability to operate freely.

此外，掸邦东部地区——特别是大其力、勐古等——也出现或扩大了与诈骗有关的活动。同样，掸邦北部的Namkham、Namhsan和木姐等城镇已成为关键热点，犯罪网络利用执法不力和地区持续不稳定的情况自由活动。

“When you look at the townships where new scam centers are emerging, locals know which armed groups control which villages. If these centers continue to grow and expand, it will become a major concern for local youth,” said Nang Hon.

“当你看到新的诈骗中心出现的城镇时，当地人知道哪个武装组织控制了哪个村庄。如果这些中心继续发展和扩大，它将成为当地年轻人关注的主要问题。”

Areas of emerging new scam centers in Shan State

掸邦新出现的诈骗中心

■Spreading to the heartland 向中心地带扩散

Online scams are increasingly spreading into Myanmar’s major cities. Since February, groups of Chinese nationals have reportedly traveled from southern Shan State to Yangon in large numbers by long-distance buses. Regular passengers along that route said they had observed this movement. These Chinese travelers have been arriving in Yangon almost daily by highway buses. It is believed that they are able to pass through inspection checkpoints by offering bribes to immigration and traffic officers.

网络诈骗越来越多地蔓延到缅甸的主要城市。据报道，自2月份以来，大批中国公民从掸邦南部乘坐长途汽车前往仰光。这条路线上的常客表示，他们观察到了这种移动。这些中国游客几乎每天都乘坐高速公路公交车抵达仰光。据信，他们可以通过贿赂移民和交通官员通过检查检查站。

In townships like Hlaing Tharyar in Yangon, Chinese nationals have been caught openly recruiting for scam operations. A lack of rule of law—and the alleged complicity of some local authorities—has allowed these networks to expand.

在仰光的Hlaing Tharyar等城镇，中国公民被发现公开招募诈骗人员。法治的缺失和一些地方当局的共谋使得这些网络得以扩张。

At the same time, there has been a noticeable rise in suspicious online messages, many apparently sent by scam networks, luring people with offers to “play games for money” or promising high-paying jobs. On Facebook groups, especially those targeting youth, there has been a surge in ads recruiting for game centers in Hlaing Tharyar. These are widely suspected to be fronts for online scam centers, commonly known as “kyar phyant”. Alarmingly, reports of missing young people have also increased, raising fears that many may be coerced or trafficked into working for these operations.

与此同时，可疑的网络信息明显增多，其中许多显然是由诈骗网络发送的，以“玩游戏赚钱”或承诺高薪工作来引诱人们。在Facebook群组中，特别是针对年轻人的群组中，为Hlaing Tharyar的游戏中心招聘的广告数量激增。这些网站被广泛怀疑是网络诈骗中心的幌子，通常被称为“kyar plant”。令人担忧的是，有关年轻人失踪的报告也有所增加，令人担心许多人可能被强迫或贩运到这些行动中工作。

“With job opportunities so scarce for young people, it’s not surprising that some may be drawn into these activities. Many of the online job ads now seem to specifically target young women,” a resident of Yangon told The Irrawaddy via the Signal app.

“由于年轻人的工作机会如此稀缺，一些人可能会被吸引到这些活动中来也就不足为奇了。现在许多在线招聘广告似乎专门针对年轻女性，”仰光的一位居民通过信号应用程序告诉伊洛瓦底。

“In Yangon, we’re seeing missing person posters almost every day, which raises serious concerns about a possible link between these disappearances and the surge in online scam recruitment,” he added.

他补充说：“在仰光，我们几乎每天都能看到失踪人口的海报，这引发了人们对这些失踪事件与网络诈骗招募激增之间可能存在联系的严重担忧。”

After the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, the country faced a sharp economic decline, resulting in the loss of around 1.6 million jobs that year, according to the International Labor Organization (ILO). Unemployment surged, especially among women and youth—female joblessness rose fivefold by 2022. Many were pushed into informal or unstable work as formal jobs disappeared. While agriculture declined, some shifted to mining and construction. By 2023, the labor market remained fragile, with instability and weak rule of law deepening poverty and job insecurity.

根据国际劳工组织（ILO）的数据，在2021年缅甸军事政变后，该国面临着急剧的经济衰退，导致当年损失了约160万个工作岗位。失业率飙升，尤其是女性和年轻女性的失业率到2022年增长了五倍。随着正式工作的消失，许多人被迫从事非正式或不稳定的工作。在农业衰退的同时，一些人转向了采矿业和建筑业。到2023年，劳动力市场依然脆弱，不稳定和法治薄弱加剧了贫困和就业不安全。

Chinese security personnel are seen along the China-Myanmar border escorting Chinese nationals back from scam centers in the Wa Self-Administered Region on September 6, 2023. / WSTV

2023年9月6日，中国安全人员沿着中缅边境护送中国公民从佤族自治区的诈骗中心返回。/ WSTV

■Invisible wars, regional consequences  隐形战争，区域性后果

For victims, the relocation of scam operations means abuse continues unchecked under fragmented governance. For China, the crackdown may have eased domestic risks, but without tackling root causes, it merely shifted the burden—risking a resurgence.

对于受害者来说，诈骗活动的转移意味着在分散的治理下，滥用行为继续不受控制。对中国来说，打击可能缓解了国内风险，但没有解决根本原因，它只是转移了负担——有可能卷土重来。

“The crackdown created pressure, but it wasn’t surgical. It simply displaced operations from border zones to deeper areas,” said Nang Hon.

“镇压造成了压力，但它不是外科手术。它只是把行动从边境地区转移到更深的地区。”

In Myanmar, power is now dictated less by politics and more by armed actors and illicit economies. These networks flourish in security vacuums, often protected by local militias and complicit officials. Beijing’s short-term containment strategy—driven by border stability and reputation—has enabled scams to spread inland.

在缅甸，权力现在更少地由政治决定，更多地由武装分子和非法经济决定。这些网络在安全真空中蓬勃发展，通常受到当地民兵和同谋官员的保护。北京的短期遏制战略——由边境稳定和声誉驱动——使得诈骗得以蔓延到内陆。

Despite rhetoric on regional peace, China continues to back Myanmar’s junta, reinforcing military solutions. This sidelines grassroots solutions and empowers corrupt forces. Unless regional actors—including China—move beyond junta-centered diplomacy and commit to inclusive, cross-border and community-informed solutions, Myanmar risks becoming a geopolitical void: a black hole for organized crime, human trafficking, digital fraud and proxy conflicts with no clear way out.

尽管中国发表了地区和平的言论，但它继续支持缅甸军政府，加强军事解决方案。这种做法将基层解决方案排除在外，助长了腐败势力。除非包括中国在内的地区行为体超越以军政府为中心的外交，并致力于包容性、跨境和社区知情的解决方案，否则缅甸有可能成为地缘政治空白：有组织犯罪、人口贩运、数字欺诈和代理人冲突的黑洞，没有明确的出路。

Athena Awn Naw specializes in analyzing ethnic conflict dynamics in Myanmar, focusing on China’s expanding influence across economic sectors. Her expertise includes the socioeconomic impacts of China’s involvement, its role in Myanmar’s armed conflicts and peace processes, and its participation in regional initiatives.

Athena Awn Naw专门分析缅甸的种族冲突动态，关注中国在经济领域不断扩大的影响力。她的专长包括中国参与的社会经济影响，中国在缅甸武装冲突与和平进程中的作用，以及中国在地区倡议中的参与。

（该文章不代表本网站观点，有所删减）

作者：Athena Awn Naw         来源：伊洛瓦底江